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 Abstract 
 
When individuals’ utility is a convex combination of their income and their concern at 
having a low relative income (the weights attached to income and to the concern at 
having a low relative income sum up to one), the maximization of aggregate utility yields 
an equal income distribution. This alignment of utilitarianism and egalitarianism is 
obtained for any number of individuals, and for general utility functions that are convex 
combinations of a power function of income and the concern at having a low relative 
income. The alignment can also hold when the weights sum up to a number different than 
one. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper addresses the tension between utilitarianism, which conceptualizes social 
welfare as the sum of the individuals’ utilities, and egalitarianism, which cherishes 
equality between individuals. We show that when individuals’ utility is a convex 
combination of their income and their concern at having a low relative income, the 
maximization of aggregate utility yields an equal income distribution. This alignment of 
utilitarianism and egalitarianism is obtained for any number of individuals, and for 
general utility functions that are convex combinations of a power function of the 
individuals’ income and of a measure of their concern at having a low relative income.  
Moreover, with respect to linear utility functions this alignment is not restricted to convex 
combinations of income and concern at having a low relative income.  
Utilitarianism postulates that the collective choice should maximize the sum of 
the individuals’ utilities. According to Bentham (1823), utility is equivalent to pleasure, 
therefore it is rational for a social planner to maximize the sum of utilities just as it is 
rational for an individual to maximize utility. It follows that the “good” from which 
individuals derive utility should be distributed in such a way that more of the good is 
given to the individuals who stand to benefit more from having the good. Mill (1863) 
refers to utilitarianism as the “Greatest Happiness Principle.” 
Egalitarianism requires a collective decision to distribute the available “good” 
(say, income) in such a way that all the individuals end up enjoying equal benefits. This 
requirement is one of the most important concepts of justice in social and political 
thought (Hare, 1981; Scanlon, 1998; Dworkin, 2000). Theories of egalitarianism differ 
from one another depending on what it is that is to be equalized: utility, resources, 
income, rights, capabilities, opportunities, or access.  
Equalizing utilities is tantamount to making individuals equal in terms of 
achieved welfare. Rawlsian equality (Rawls, 1999) is the equality of “primary goods,” 
namely “things that every rational man is presumed to want,” namely “rights, liberties 
and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect” (Rawls, 1999, 
pp. 60-65). Rawls condemns inequalities by invoking the “Difference Principle” 
according to which priority is given to the worst-off individuals. There can be no trade-
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offs between basic liberties and gains in terms of utility. Sen (1980) notes that Rawlsian 
equality is incomplete in the sense that it is too concerned with primary goods instead of 
with what these goods bring to people, and intimates the need for utility to take into 
account “pleasures,” regardless of their source. Thus, Sen defines “basic capability 
equality,” which “can be seen as a natural extension of Rawls’s concern with primary 
goods, shifting attention from goods to what goods do to human beings” (Sen, 1980, pp. 
218-219). Sen simply acknowledges the fact that human beings differ, and “that the 
conversion of goods to capabilities varies from person to person substantially” (Sen, 
1980, p. 219). Opportunities are the object of equalization in the theory of equality of 
opportunity (Roemer, 1998). According to this theory, individuals differ with respect to 
characteristics beyond their control (circumstances), and with respect to characteristics 
within their control (responsibility parameters). Circumstances are the illegitimate source 
of inequalities and, thus, the goal of a society is to eliminate such inequalities without 
distorting inequalities that arise due to responsibility parameters.  
In social and political thought, egalitarianism is a meta-theory with the specifics 
depending on the equalizandum in question. In this regard, even utilitarianism can be 
interpreted as an egalitarian ethic for which treating individuals as equals entails 
equalization of marginal utilities (Harsanyi, 1977). Nevertheless, in public discourse in 
modern democratic societies, “an egalitarian” is typically a person who supports greater 
income and wealth equality. It is this type of egalitarianism that Sen (1973, p. 18) appears 
to have in mind when he states that “[i]t seems fairly clear that fundamentally 
utilitarianism is very far from an egalitarian approach.”  
Taking this statement as our starting point, in this paper we attend to “income 
egalitarianism,” although our findings can apply to the more general context of “resource 
egalitarianism.” The “resources” can be external material goods (such as land), or 
Rawlsian primary goods. Resource egalitarianism is essentially a non-welfarist ethic, that 
is, it is not concerned with the utility / wellbeing that individuals derive from resources, 
whereas utilitarianism is the best-known welfaristic criterion. Our contribution is to show 
that under different sets of conditions, when inter-personal comparisons of the type 
modelled by us are taken into account, utilitarianism and egalitarianism are equivalent. 
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Indeed, the utilitarian and egalitarian stands typically entail different distributions 
of a given aggregate income. To a utilitarian social planner, issues such as equality of 
incomes or of utilities are immaterial. A utilitarian social planner directs the available 
income to those who have “superior efficiency in producing utility” (Sen, 1980, p. 203). 
To illustrate this principle, consider the utility functions 1 1 1( )u x = x  and 2 2 2( ) 100u x = x , 
where ix  is the income of individual i, 1,2i = . To maximize social welfare, a utilitarian 
social planner will allocate the entire available income to individual 2. As put vividly by 
Sen (1980), the (say) cripple (individual 1) is doubly worse off compared to the pleasure-
wizard (individual 2): first, because he receives less income and second, because he 
derives lower utility from a given level of income. When individuals’ utilities depend on 
their income, then equalizing marginal utilities will usually mandate unequal division of a 
given total income. In short, in most cases, an optimal income distribution under a 
utilitarian rule will diverge from the income distribution under an egalitarian rule.  
Interestingly, and along with many others, in a spirited debate Tullock (1975) and 
Sen (1982) have already grappled with the assumptions or conditions necessary to render 
equal division the optimal distributional rule for a given total income, and were 
pondering whether the utilitarian approach to the maximization of social welfare can be 
made compatible with egalitarian principles. However, neither of them used individuals’ 
concern at having a low relative income as a conciliator. Modern day evidence from 
econometric studies, experimental economics, social psychology, and neuroscience 
indicates that people routinely compare themselves with others who constitute their 
“comparison” or “reference” group, and that the negative outcome of upward 
comparisons (cf., for example, Andolfatto, 2002; Frey and Stutzer, 2002), impinges on 
their sense of wellbeing (Fliessbach et al., 2007; Takahashi et al., 2009; Clark and Senik, 
2010). People are unhappy when their consumption, income, or social standing fall below 
those of others with whom they naturally compare themselves (those who constitute their 
“reference group”). Consequently, economic processes are impacted, and economic 
realizations differ from what they would have been if comparisons with others did not 
matter (see, for example, Stark and Taylor, 1991; Zizzo and Oswald, 2001; Luttmer, 
2005; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008; Stark and Hyll, 2011).  
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Taking total income as given, the example presented above shows starkly that 
when individuals care only about their absolute income, the maximization of a social 
welfare function that sums up the individuals’ utilities mandates allocating the available 
income such that the individual who values income most highly ends up receiving the 
entire income. This result is obvious and, of course, is well-known. However, when 
individuals care also about trailing behind others in the income hierarchy (exhibit a 
concern at relative deprivation), we show that maximization of the social welfare 
function mandates income equalization. This result is somewhat surprising. Had 
individuals’ utilities been strictly positive under income equality and equal to zero 
otherwise, then it would not have been surprising for utilitarianism to mandate income 
equalization. However, this paper provides conditions under which any concern at one’s 
income falling behind the incomes of others suffices to nudge the utilitarian social 
planner to distribute incomes equally. 
In Section 2 we show that when individuals feel concern at having a low relative 
income, a utilitarian social planner will divide the available income equally. In Section 3 
we show that the alignment of the optimal utilitarian income distribution with the optimal 
egalitarian income distribution is not confined to utility functions in which the 
preferences concerning absolute income are linear. In Section 4 we offer our conclusion.  
 
2. The tension between utilitarianism and income equality forgone: linear utility 
functions 
We study the maximization of a utilitarian social welfare function (the sum of the 
individuals’ utility functions). Here, the social planner is impartial in the sense that in the 
construction of the social welfare function, the utility function of each individual is 
accorded the same weight. Individual utility functions depend on both absolute income 
and “relative deprivation,” our chosen measure of the concern at having a low relative 
income. When the weights attached to absolute income and to relative deprivation sum up 
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to one, we show that the maximization of a utilitarian objective entails income 
equalization.1 
To begin with, consider two individuals, 1,2i  , who are not concerned about 
relative deprivation, who attach a weight (0,1)i   to absolute income ix , and whose 
utility function is )(i i i iu x x . It is clear that the utilitarian social planner will give all 
the available income to the individual whose i  is higher. Only in the special case of 
1 2   the equal division of incomes is optimal for the utilitarian but then, any division 
is also optimal. 
Acknowledging the concern at relative deprivation, let the utility functions take 
the form 
 1 2 1 2( , ) (1 ) ( , )i i i i iu x x x RD x x    ,  
such that (0,1)i  , 1 2 1( , ) max{ ,0}2 ji iRD x x x x   is the index of relative deprivation of 
individual i, where j i . Let the available income be 1 2x x A  . Then, we have that 
1 2
1( , ) max{ 2 ,0}
2 ii
RD x x A x  . For i jx x , we get that 1 2 1( , ) ( 2 ) 02i iRD x x A x   , 
and that 1 2( , ) 0jRD x x  . When income is transferred from individual j  to individual i , 
without changing the hierarchy of the two income earners, the marginal increase in i ’s 
utility is 1 ( 2) 1
2
i
i
    , whereas the marginal decrease in j ’s utility is j . Because 
1j  , transferring income from j  to i  increases the sum of the individuals’ utilities, 
and is in accord with the goal of the utilitarian social planner. Consequently, * *1 2 2
Ax x   
(where a star indicates optimal value) is the unique optimum of the utilitarian social 
                                                 
1 The inference that utilitarianism aligns with egalitarianism draws upon, but is not contingent on, the 
weights in the individuals’ utility functions necessarily summing up to 1. Under such an assumption, the 
utility functions have the characteristic that an individual’s weak taste for absolute income correlates with a 
strong distaste for low relative income (and vice versa). However, incorporation of the individuals’ distaste 
for low relative income can sustain the alignment of utilitarianism with egalitarianism even when the 
weights in the individuals’ utility functions do not sum up to 1, though additional conditions then need to 
be imposed. In Appendix B we provide the analysis of such case of preferences’ specification. 
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welfare function. When a concern at having a low relative income is acknowledged by 
the utilitarian social planner, moving to an equal division causes less pain to the 
individual from whom income is taken away than it brings joy to the individual whose 
income is increased. As we show next, this intuition carries through in the case of any 
number of individuals.  
In a population consisting of 2n   individuals, let the income of individual i be 
ix . The income distribution of the population is represented by a vector 0
nx R . We 
define the relative deprivation of individual i, ( )iRD x , as2 
  
1
1( ) max ,0
n
i j i
j
RD x x x
n 
  . (1) 
Let the utility function of individual i be 
 ( ) (1 ) ( )i i i i iu x = x RD x   , (2)  
where (0 1)i ,  . Let the social welfare be measured by the utilitarian function 
 
1
( ) ( )
n
i
i
SWF x = u x

 .  
To find the optimal income distribution under a budget constraint 0A > , we search for 
the solution to the maximization problem 
 
1
0
max ( )
for  s.t.  .n
n
i
i
SWF x
x x = A

 R  (3) 
The form of the individuals’ utility function (2), in which the coefficients sum up 
to one, is equivalent to the social planner “giving” to an individual 100 percent of weight 
that he can assign to income and relative deprivation in any way that he wants. Then, we 
can ascertain that each individual’s preferences enter the maximization problem with 
equal “importance:” the sum of the coefficients is constant for all individuals, and in the 
                                                 
2 In an Appendix, Stark (2013) attends to the origins of the concept of relative deprivation, elaborates on 
the measure, and provides more evidence that upward interpersonal comparisons affect significantly 
subjective wellbeing.  
  7
process of maximizing aggregated utility the social planner is impartial. 
In the following proposition we state and prove the main result of this paper: 
maximization of (3) yields as a solution equal distribution of incomes. The policy 
implication of this result is quite stark: the utilitarian social planner does not need to 
collect information on the magnitudes of the individuals’ i ’s, nor can any individual 
affect the allocation of the utilitarian social planner by voluntarily reporting a particular 
high weight accorded, say, to his concern at having a low relative income. As long as 
(0,1)i   for all {1, , }ni  , such reporting is inconsequential for the utilitarian and the 
egalitarian social planners reaching unanimity. 
Proposition 1: The unique solution to (3) is 
 * A A Ax = , , ,
n n n
    .  
Proof: The proof is in Appendix A. 
Proposition 1 states that a consensus between the utilitarian and the egalitarian 
social planners does not hinge on the size of the population concerned being limited to 
just two individuals. When the coefficients in the utility function of the individuals that 
are assigned to absolute income, i , and to relative deprivation, 1 i , sum up to 1, the 
unique solution to (3) is the egalitarian income distribution. 
It is of interest to note that the inequality (A1) obtained in the course of proving 
Proposition 1 has an appealing interpretation: it says that, starting from an egalitarian 
distribution *x , increasing the income of any k individuals at the expense of the 
remaining n k  individuals would yield a bigger loss of utility for those from whom 
income is taken away than the gain of utility for those whose income is raised, just as in 
the case of the two-person example.  
We next show that our result does not hinge on a linear specification of 
preferences for absolute income. 
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3. The tension between utilitarianism and income equality forgone: nonlinear utility 
functions 
Hitherto we have assumed that the preferences for absolute income are linear. We now 
show that our result that concern at having a low relative income leads a utilitarian social 
planner to allocate incomes equally does not hinge on such a class of functions.  
Let the budget constraint be /A n e . This condition is tantamount to a 
requirement that the income to be given to each individual under equal income 
distribution, /A n , cannot be “too low.” (To put it more bluntly, for our result to hold it 
suffices that the egalitarian level of the income of an individual is not less than 1/2.) The 
rationale behind this condition is related to the decreasing marginal utility from absolute 
income in the case of the particular specification of preferences discussed here (cf. (4) 
below). A high enough budget constraint ensures that under a perfectly equal income 
distribution, the marginal utility from “shifting” income towards individuals with high 
 ’s will not override the marginal disutility from low relative income experienced by 
individuals with low  ’s. 
Let the utility function of individual i, 1,...,i n , be 
 ( ) (1 ) ( )i i i iiu x x RD x
    , (4) 
where , (0,1)i    and where ( )iRD x  is defined as in (1). We obtain the following 
result. 
Proposition 2: Let the individual’s utility function be of the form given by (4). Then, if 
/A n e , maximization of utilitarian social welfare results in a perfectly equal income 
distribution *x . 
Proof: The proof is in Appendix C. 
Proposition 2 accords robustness to the result that when the utilitarian social 
planner acknowledges the individuals’ concern at having a low relative income, he will 
choose an egalitarian income distribution. We reiterate that as long as 
(0,1)i  {1,..., }ni , this result does not hinge on the particular magnitudes of the 
individuals’ i ’s, nor even on knowing them. 
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4. Conclusion  
It is fairly widely recognized in economics that the utility of individuals is shaped via a 
process of relatedness and comparison with others. We have followed this perspective in 
research stretching over the past two decades, incorporating perceptions as diverse as 
altruism and social stigma (for example, Stark, 1993, and Fan and Stark, 2011, 
respectively). Here, we acknowledge that an individual cares about his income trailing 
behind the incomes of others in his “comparison group.” In such a setting, when assigned 
the task of dividing the available income to maximize social welfare, a utilitarian social 
planner who, without such an acknowledgement will choose a “corner solution,” will act 
exactly the same as an egalitarian social planner; a long-lived tension in social choice and 
welfare economics is resolved. This conclusion is robust to alternative characterizations 
(linear and non-linear) of the preference for absolute income.  
That individuals’ preferences incorporate a relative deprivation term changes 
substantially a good many implications of the standard economic models. For example, in 
structuring optimal taxation, a desire for status calls for higher marginal taxes (Boskin 
and Sheshinski, 1978; Oswald, 1983; Blomquist, 1993; Aronsson and Johansson-
Stenman, 2008; Wendner and Goulder, 2008). Concerns about status and relative 
deprivation bear on labor supply (Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998), economic growth 
(Easterlin, 1974; Clark et al., 2008), poverty measurement (Sen, 1973), migration 
decisions (Stark and Taylor, 1991), and risk-taking behavior (Callan et al., 2008; Haisley 
et al., 2008). In a similar vein we show in this paper that such concerns are also important 
for designing welfare maximizing income policies.  
When considering the welfare effects of alternative policies, egalitarian 
distribution should be studied in and by itself. This is particularly true when individual 
utility functions depend only on absolute and relative income (or consumption). It is not 
all that clear, however, how relative deprivation “fares” against other concerns such as 
labor supply / leisure, which are also important for the behavior of economic aggregates. 
One recent attempt to merge decisions how much effort to exert, relative deprivation, and 
inequality outcomes as measured by the Gini index is Sorger and Stark (2013). There is 
little doubt in our mind that the roles of concern at relative deprivation and low status in 
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the design of welfare maximizing income policies, and the characteristic social welfare 
functions are subjects ripe for additional inquiry. 
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1 
With n  individuals, there are !n  possible orderings of incomes (permutations of the set 
{1,2,..., }n ). Assuming a specific ordering 1 2 nx x x  , we proceed to show that a 
corresponding result holds independently of the values of 1,..., n  . By symmetry of the 
maximized function with respect to incomes and income weights, the result obtained 
below holds for other orderings of incomes.  
Without loss of generality, and normalizing the sum of incomes if necessary, we 
assume that this sum is 
1
1
n
i
i
x =

 . The set of admissible distributions 
1 2
1
0: , 1
n
n
n i
i
D x x x x x =

      R  is convex (in fact, it is a convex polytope) and 
has a finite number of extremal points of the form  
  1, 2,...,k n ,  
where we have that *(1/ ,1/ ,...,1/ )nx n n n x  . 
Over the closed set D , the function SWF  is linear and therefore its maximum on 
D is attained in one of the extremal points kx . We have that  
, 
namely, compared to nx , kx  for k n  represents taking away income from k individuals 
and distributing that income equally between the remainder n k  individuals. 
A distribution nx  constitutes a unique maximum if and only if 
( ) ( )n kSWF x > SWF x  for any k n . To see this, note that  
1
1 1 1 1 n
i
i n k
n k = k > α
n k n k n   
             , 
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1 1
1 1n n
i i
i n k i n k
n kα > α
n k n     
  , 
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1n n k n n k
i i i i
i n k i i n k i
n kα + α α + α
n n k n n
 
       
     , 
1 1 1
1 1 1 ( )
n n n k
i i i
i i n k i
α > α + α n k
n k n

    
       . 
We have 
1 1 1
( ) ( 1) (1 )
n k n k n k
i i i
i i i
α n k = α α
  
  
        . 
Consequently, we get 
 
1 1 1
1 1 1( ) (1 ) ( )
n n n k
n k
i i i
i i n k i
SWF x α > α α SWF x
n k n

    
       (A1) 
for any k n , which completes the proof that *nx x  is the maximum. □ 
 
Appendix B: A loosened assumption on the weights in the individuals’ preferences 
In this Appendix we attend to a model of preferences in which there are two (positive) 
parameters in the individual’s utility function rather than one: 0i   weight to be placed 
on individual’s i own income, and 0i   weight to be placed on low relative income, 
that is, the individual’s utility function is  
 ( ) ( )i i ii iu x x RD x   . (B1) 
When this extra degree of freedom is allowed, we obtain the result that, as we increase 
the   weights, loosely speaking, the optimal utilitarian solution moves toward 
egalitarianism or, more correctly, social welfare decreases as we move away from 
egalitarianism.  
Taking first as an example two individuals, and using the same notation as in the 
beginning of Section 2, for the case of jix x , when income is transferred from 
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individual j  to individual i , without changing the hierarchy of the two income earners, 
the marginal increase in i ’s utility is i i  , whereas the marginal decrease in j ’s utility 
is j . Unlike in the case of two parameters 1 2,   in which the marginal gain of 
individual i, which is equal to 1, is greater than the marginal loss of individual j, which is 
equal to (0,1)j  , here the marginal gain of i will be greater than the marginal loss of j 
if ji i   , which translates into the condition that the marginal disutility of low 
relative income of the poorer individual, i , has to be larger than the difference between 
the two individuals’ marginal utilities of own income, j i  . From analyzing in a 
similar manner the case of jix x , we get an analogous condition on the marginal 
increase in social welfare, namely j i j    .  
Summing up: when the weights in the utility function of an individual do not sum 
up to 1, then for equality of incomes to be the optimal utilitarian solution, that is, for 
* *
21 2
Ax x   to obtain, we need to have that 1 2 1     and that 12 2    . 
This extension to a setting of the weights not summing up to one can be carried 
further and be applied to the case of more than two individuals. Let the utility of the i-th, 
 1,...,ni , individual in a population with income vector 1( ,..., )nx x x  be described by 
(B1). In the following proposition we state and prove a condition on the weights ,i i   in 
the population which, if satisfied, yields that the egalitarian income distribution 
maximizes utilitarian social welfare. 
Proposition B1: If 
 2j j l l
n
n
       (B2)  
for all j l , then the egalitarian income distribution maximizes social welfare. 
Proof: The problem of the utilitarian social planner under a budget constraint 0A >  is 
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0
1
max ( )
for  s.t. ,n
n
i
i
SWF x
x x = A

 R  (B3) 
where 
1
( ) ( )i
n
i
SWF x u x

  . With n  individuals, there are !n  possible orderings of 
incomes (permutations of the set {1, 2,..., }n ). In what follows, we divide the 
maximization problem (B3) into !n  sub-problems corresponding each to a given ordering 
of incomes, and we show that in each sub-problem the egalitarian income distribution 
 * / , / , , /x = A n A n A n  is optimal. 
Specifically, we divide the set 0
1
:n
n
i
i
X x = Ax


    R  into sets PX , PPX X  , 
where the summation is over all possible orderings of incomes. For Px X , the income 
of individual ( )P i  is the i-th lowest in the population, namely (1) (2) ( )...P P P nx x x   ; and 
( ) ( ){ : }P P k P lX x X x x k l    .3 Obviously, * Px X  for every P . For the ordering 
P , the maximization problem is 
 max ( )
Px X
SWF x

. (B4) 
For Px X  the social welfare function can be rewritten as 
 ( ) ( )
1
( )  P i P i
n
i
SWF x a x

  ,  
where 
 
1
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
( ) 1 iP i
P i P i P j
j
n i
a =
n n
 

   . (B5) 
Consider the income distribution Px X  which is not egalitarian, namely *x x , 
                                                 
3 To illustrate our notation, consider 3n   and 1 2 3 )( , , (2,1,1)x x x x  . For such an x , we have that 
32 1x x x  . Then, x  belongs to QX , where Q  is a permutation of the set {1, 2,3}  such that (1) 2Q  , 
(2) 3Q  , and (3) 1Q  ; and it also belongs to RX , where R  is a permutation of the set {1,2,3}  such that 
(1) 3R  , (2) 2R  , and (3) 1R  . 
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and a set of individuals whose income is the lowest in the population under distribution 
x . Obviously, individual (1)P  belongs to this set. We introduce (1) ( )max{ :  }x P P ii i x x  . 
The individuals (1)P ,…, ( )xP i  have the same income, the lowest in the population. Given 
that *x x , we have that ( )xP i n , and that ( ) ( 1)x xP i P ix x  . We construct an income 
distribution Px X  such that x x   in the following way: for 1xi i  , 
1
( ) ( 1)
( ) ( )
1
1
1 1
x
x x
i
x P i P i
P i P j
jx x
i x x
x x
i i
 

    , and for 1xi i  , ( ) ( )P i P ix x  . We thus obtain that 
 ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1)( ) ( ) ( 1) ( 1)
1
( 1) ( )
( ) ( 1)
1
( ) ( )
1 1
 .
1
x
x x x x
x x x
x
x x
x
i
x P i P i x P i P i
P j P i P i P i
j x x
i
P i P i
P j x P i
jx
SWF x SWF x
i x x i x x
a x a x
i i
x x
a i a
i
 
 




 
              
      


 (B6) 
Next, from (B2) applied to {1,..., }j i  and to 1l i  , we obtain by summation 
that 
 ( 1)( ) ( ) ( 1)
1
( 2)
( )
i
P i
P j P j P i
j
i n
i
n
   

   ,  
which implies  
 ( 1)( ) ( ) ( 1)
1
( 1)
( )
i
P i
P j P j P i
j
i n i
i
n
   

    . (B7) 
Recalling (B5), because 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
i i i
P j P j P j
j j j
n ia
n
 
  
    ,  
and because 
 ( 1)( 1) ( 1) ( )
1
( 1) iP i
P i P i P j
j
i n i iia = i
n n
  

    ,  
we get from (B7) that 
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 ( ) ( 1)
1
i
P j P i
j
a ia 

  (B8) 
for all {1,..., 1}i n  .  
Thus, by joining (B6) and (B8), we have that ( ) ( ) 0SWF x SWF x   . 
Consequently, distribution x  such that *x x  cannot be a solution to (B4). Because the 
set PX  is compact, ( )SWF x  attains its maximum over this set. Therefore, distribution 
*x  
is the solution to (B4) for any ordering P , and *x  is the unique maximum of the social 
welfare function over the set X . □ 
 
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2 
Akin to the proof of Proposition 1, and again without loss of generality, we assume a 
specific ordering of the incomes, 1 2 nx x x  , and show that the result holds 
independently of the values of 1,..., n  . The symmetry of the maximized function with 
respect to incomes and income weights implies that the result obtained below holds for 
other orderings of incomes. For the assumed ordering, the maximization problem of the 
utilitarian social planner is 
 
 
1 1
1 1
1
1max
s.t.  = ;   0;    for 2,...,  .
n n
i
i i j ix i j i
n
i i i
i
x x x
n
x = A x x x i n
 
  

 

         
     
 

  
We denote  
1 1
1( )
n n
i
i i j i
i j i
F x x x x
n
 
  
        , 1( )
n
i
i
h x x A

  , and 1( )  i i ig x x x  
for all  2,...,i n , 1 1( )  g x x . Transforming the maximization problem to a 
minimization problem, 
 
min ( )
s.t.  ( ) 0,  ( ) 0 for {1,..., },i i n
F x
h x g x    
we obtain the Lagrangian 
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 
1
1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ).
n
i i
i
n n n
i
i i j i i i
i j i i
L F x g x h x
x x x g x h x
n

 
  

   
  
        

  
  
We have that 
 1 11 1 1 2
1
1( 1) ,L x n
x n
                
that 
 
1
1
1
1
,
n
j
n n n
jn
L x
x n
    

        
and that 
 
1
1
1
1
1 1( )
l
j l
l l l l
jl
L x n l
x n n
       

            
for  2,..., 1 l n . 
Because the maximized function F is convex,4 and the feasible set D is described 
by affine constraints, the following set of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions is both 
sufficient and necessary for x  to be a unique minimum: 
 
 
0,  {1,...,
( )
} ,
(
0,  1,...,  ,
( ) 0,  ( ) 0,  
) 0 .
l
l
l l l
L x l n
x
h
x
x
g g x l n 

 
 



   
We now show that point * ( / , / ,..., / )x A n A n A n  satisfies the preceding conditions and 
that, therefore, it constitutes the global minimum of this problem. 
                                                 
4 Note that given (0,1)  , we have that 
2
2
2 ( 1) 0l l
l
F x
x
         for {1, ..., }l n  and that 
2
0
l k
F
x x
    
for k l , which implies that the Hessian matrix of F is positive definite. 
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We note that because *1 / 0x A n  , we set 1 0  , and hence the considered 
problem reduces to a set of linear equations in 2 ,..., ,  n . We denote 
 
1
1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1( 1)                       1,
1
                           ,      
1 1( )     otherwise.       
n
j
l n
j
l
j l
l
j
A n n l
n
C A n l n
n
A n n l
n n





 
 
  








             


  
Thus, we obtain 
 
1 2
1
                      1,
                        ,
              otherwise, 
n n
l l l
C l
C l n
C
 
 
  
         
  
which can be written as 
 C v ,  
where  1 2( ) ,  , ,...,   nl l nC C v , and 
 
1 1 0 ... ... ... 0
1 1 1 0 ... ... 0
1 0 1 1 0 ... 0
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
1 0 ... ... 0 1 1
1 0 ... ... ... 0 1
               
.  
It can easily be verified that 
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 1
1 1 1 1 1 1...
1 1 1 1 1 1...
2 2 2 2 2 2...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
1 1 1 1 1 1...
n n n n n n
n
n n n n n n
n n
n n n n n n
n
n n n n n n

                          
.  
Then, 
 
1
1

  n l
l
C
n
,  
and for  1, 2,..., 1 i n  
 1 1 1
1 1
  ( ,..., )   
  
    i ni l l i n
l l i
n i iC C f
n n
.  
Obviously the functions 1if  are linear and, moreover, for  1,2,..., 1 i n , we have that 
1(1,...,1) 0. if  We calculate for j l  
 1 1l
l
C n lA n
n
 
     ,  
for j l  
 1l
j
C
n
   ,  
and for j l  
 0l
j
C

  .  
Therefore, for j i  we obtain 
 11
1
0
n n
ji l l
l j l jj j j j
Cf C Ci i i A n
n n
    
 
  
                ,  
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whereas for j i , we have 
 
 
1
2
1
1
1 1
1
1
( )
1 .
i n
ji l l
l j l ij j j j
Cf C Cn i i
n n
n i n j i j i n iA n
n n n n
n i A n
n




 


 

   




            
           
 
 
  
From the assumption that /A n e  we get that 
1
1A n   , where this last inequality is 
due to the fact that 
1
1
1
lim 1/ e    ,5 and that 
1
1    as a function of   is non-decreasing.6 
Thus, we have that  1
11
1 1 11 1 0nA n n

    

 
          
. Therefore, 1 0i
j
f


   for 
any  1,2,..., 1 i n  and  1,...,j n . Thus, because 1(1,...,1) 0if   , for any set of 
weights 1,...,( 0, )) ( 1
n
n    we obtain that 11( ,..., ) 0i nf     for  1, 2,..., 1 i n . 
In sum, we obtained a set of non-negative multipliers 2 ,..., n   for inequality 
constraints 2 ,..., ng g  which are satisfied by 
*x  with equality. This completes the proof 
that *x  is the global maximum of the considered problem. □ 
                                                 
5 We have that 
l1
1 1
1
n
1
lim lim 1 /e e

 
 
  
 
   because from l'Hospital's rule we obtain that 
1
ln
1
1
lim


   . 
6 For 
1
1( )f     we have that 
1
2
1
) l( 0
(1
n
)
f

   
   
       due to the fact that 
1
ln x
x
x   for any 
0x  . 
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